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When Children and the Elderly Are Victims:
Balancing the Rights of the Accused
Against Those of the Victim
PROFESSOR CHARLES W. EHRHARDT*
Child sexual abuse prosecutions involve difficult societal issues as
well as complex evidentiary and constitutional problems. The abusive
act frequently occurs in private upon a young victim who proves an
unpersuasive witness during a subsequent trial. Often only two eye wit-
nesses exist, the victim and the accused, thus making the victim's credi-
bility a critical issue. Because of the nature of these prosecutions, there
has been a special focus on the principles regulating the admissibility of
evidence in child abuse cases. Balancing the due process and constitu-
tional rights of the accused against the interests of both the child and
society in these cases has been difficult for the judicial system and the
legislature. Recently, similar concerns have arisen when the victim of a
criminal act is an elderly person who suffers the frailties of age. These
Symposium Comments address a series of related issues dealing with
the admission of: (1) out-of-court statements of both the child and the
elderly victim; (2) expert testimony explaining the victim's conduct
based on certain observed syndromes; and (3) prior acts of sexual
misconduct.
I.
EXPERT TESTIMONY BASED ON SYNDROMES
During the prosecution of a child abuse case, expert testimony may
be offered based on either Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syn-
drome ("CSAAS") or Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome ("CSAS") to prove
that the abusive act occurred or to explain the subsequent conduct of the
victim. One of the important issues in determining the admissibility of
this evidence is whether either syndrome has the necessary scientific
validity or reliability. Michael Stanger's Comment Throwing the Baby
Out With the Bathwater labels the Florida Supreme Court's opinion in
Hadden v. State' overbroad. Hadden ruled that testimony based on
either syndrome was inadmissible in child sexual abuse prosecutions
because the syndromes do not meet the Frye test of general acceptance
* Mason Ladd Professor of Evidence, Florida State University College of Law; Visiting
Professor, University of Georgia School of Law (Fall 2001).
1. 690 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1997).
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in the relevant scientific community.2
The development of Florida la'w relating to the admissibility of so-
called syndrome evidence in child sexual abuse cases coincides with the
resolution of the uncertainty in Florida as to whether the Frye standard
or some other test applied to expert testimony based on scientific princi-
ples or methodologies. For example, in Ward v. State, the First District
Court of Appeal applied a relevancy test and deemed testimony based on
child abuse syndrome admissible.3 In Kruse v. State, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal applied a Section 90.4034 balancing test and held that
post-traumatic stress syndome is admissible in a child sexual abuse
case.5 After the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the Frye test
applied,6 it held in Flanagan v. State that the expert testimony of a psy-
chologist concerning offender profile syndrome is inadmissible because
it is not generally accepted in the scientific community.7
The testimony of a mental health counselor based on CSAAS, con-
cerning the symptoms typically associated with sexually abused chil-
dren, was offered in Hadden v. State apparently as circumstantial
evidence that the sexual abuse occurred.8 The District Court of Appeal
certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether the Frye
standard should be applied to "testimony by a qualified psychologist that
the alleged victim in a sexual abuse case exhibits symptoms consistent
with those of a child who has been sexually abused."9 The Hadden deci-
sion restated that Frye applies to syndrome evidence, but the decision
created uncertainty because the court's opinion went beyond the ques-
tioned certified. The court clearly stated: "[W]e align ourselves with
those courts in other states ... which have determined that a psycholo-
gist's syndrome testimony about CSAAS is inadmissible as substantive
evidence of the defendant's guilt."'" This language is limited to expert
testimony based on syndrome evidence offered to prove that the abusive
act was committed on the victim. Near the end of the opinion, however,
the court made the broader statement: "[T]his [syndrome] evidence may
not be used in a criminal prosecution for child abuse."' ' This latter sen-
tence may broaden the impact of the court's decision and create uncer-
tainty concerning the admissibility of testimony based on CSAAS, when
2. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3. 519 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
4. 483 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
5. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2001).
6. Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1989).
7. 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993).
8. Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1997).
9. Id. at 573.
10. Id. at 577.
11. Id. at 581.
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offered to rehabilitate the victim by explaining the victim's conduct after
the victim's credibility has been attacked.
Mr. Stanger argues that the Hadden court failed to differentiate
between the two syndromes and further that CSAAS should be admissi-
ble to rehabilitate the credibility of a victim-witness. The Comment
claims that testimony offered for that purpose is not subject to Frye and
that testimony based on CSAAS would survive a Frye analysis in any
event.' 2 However, since Frye principles are generally applicable to
social science theories and methodologies, including testimony based on
certain observed syndromes, there is no apparent reason why Frye
should not apply to expert testimony given during the prosecution's
rebuttal case as well as when it is offered to rehabilitate another wit-
ness.13 Generally, all testimony based on new or novel scientific princi-
ples or methodologies is subject to a Frye screening regardless of when
during the trial the testimony is offered.
Mr. Stanger's argument that testimony based on CSAAS meets the
Frye standard when the testimony is used to rehabilitate or explain the
behavior of the victim after that victim's actions have been questioned,
however, may prevail. Florida courts have recognized that within a
given community of experts the level of acceptance of methodologies
and principles may change over time. For example, courts initially
excluded expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome because
it was not based on principles bearing sufficient acceptance in the rele-
vant scientific community. 4 In later Florida decisions, however, courts
found that the underlying methodology had developed to a point of gen-
eral acceptance. Under current law, expert testimony based on the prin-
ciple is admissible in Florida under Frye. 5 Ultimately, a prosecutor
may be able to demonstrate, through evidence offered at a Ramirez-Frye
12. I am less confident than Mr. Stanger that CSAAS would be seen by courts as passing the
Frye test. Mr. Stanger relies primarily on Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994). In Jones,
the Florida Supreme Court held that the Florida statutory rape statute is constitutional. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Kogan found a compelling state interest in preventing sexual
exploitation of young children. He relied in part on CSAAS in reaching his decision. He was
careful, however, to explain that he was using it to explain the societal impact of childhood sexual
exploitation and that the syndrome "has been controversial in other states when used to help prove
child sexual exploitation in a criminal context." Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1090 n.8.
13. The court rejected an attempt to avoid the application of Frye to expert testimony based
on a syndrome on the basis that it was admitted as "background" evidence in Flanagan v. State,
625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993).
14. Hawthorne v. State, 470 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
15. State v. Hixson, 630 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. 1994) (stating that "Since this second
Hawthorne opinion, the battered-spouse syndrome 'has gained substantial scientific acceptance to
warrant admissibility."'); see also Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1997) (finding that certain
techniques used in analyzing DNA fingerprints is admissible under Frye due to increased
acceptance of these techniques within the scientific and expert community).
20011
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hearing,16 that CSAAS if offered for rehabilitative purposes is generally
accepted; validating Mr. Stanger's conclusion.17
II.
OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS OF VICTIMS WHO ARE
CHILDREN OR ELDERLY
A. Statements for Diagnosis or Treatment
Frequently, it is important to the prosecution of a child sexual
abuse case to determine the admissibility of out-of-court statements of a
young child that either describe the abusive act or identify the abuser.
When a child is treated by a pediatrician or psychologist, the child may
relate the details of the abusive act as well as the identity of the abuser.
If the child is incompetent to testify or is an ineffective witness in court,
the admission of the child's hearsay statements to these professionals
may determine whether there is sufficient evidence to submit the prose-
cution's case to the jury or for the jury to convict.
Prosecutors could attempt to admit these statements under section
90.803(4),18 the hearsay exception for statements made for the purpose
of medical diagnosis or treatment. Although Federal Rule of Evidence
803(4) generally prohibits testimony concerning out-of-court statements
to medical providers of fault or identity,1 9 in United States v. Renville2"
this prohibition was relaxed in the case of a young child who was sexu-
ally abused. The Renville court reasoned that the sexual abuse of "chil-
dren at home presents a wholly different situation" from that normally
encountered under Rule 803(4) since the identity of the abuser as a
member of the family or household may be relevant to the child's treat-
ment.2 ' Many courts have followed suit. Celina Contreras's Comment
Won or Lost the Battle criticizes the Florida Supreme Court for not
adopting the Renville court's approach in State v. Jones.22 In Jones, the
16. See Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995).
17. Judge Ervin's dissent in Flanagan, which was approved by the Supreme Court, noted
that: "If ... the defense has attacked a witness's credibility, the courts often permit profile or
syndrome evidence for the purpose of only rehabilitating the witness by showing that such
apparently inconsistent conduct is in fact consistent with the syndrome or characteristics of a
sexually assaulted victim." Flanagan v. State, 586 So. 2d 1085, 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) acq. in
result 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993).
18. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(4) (2001).
19. In Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901
(1988), the Florida Supreme Court found that statements of fault made by a gunshot victim to an
emergency room physician were not admissible under section 90.803(4) because they were not
pertinent to treatment.
20. 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985).
21. Id. at 437.
22. 625 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1993).
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Florida Supreme Court held that a child abuse victim's out-of-court
statements that identified the abuser are inadmissible under the medical
diagnosis exception and found that their admissibility should be deter-
mined under section 90.803(23),23 the hearsay exception for victims of
child abuse.
Ms. Contreras recognizes that statements made by young children
to a physician may lack the reliability usually associated with similar
statements by an adult as a result of the child's inability to understand
that their medical diagnosis or treatment depends on the statements.
Accordingly, she argues that statements by child abuse victims concern-
ing identity should be admissible under section 90.803(4) and section
90.803(23). Ms. Contreras suggests that the Florida Supreme Court
could adopt a set of special factors to be applied to out-of-court state-
ments admitted under section 90.803(4) as opposed to section
90.803(23) in order to ensure that the statements are reliable.24
Ms. Contreras's argument, however, conflicts with the legislative
history of section 90.803(23). The Jones decision relied on legislative
history connected to the adoption of section 90.803(23), the exception
for statements of young children who are victims of sexual abuse. In
Jones, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the legislature did not
intend to admit statements of identity or fault under section 90.803(4),
the exception for reliable statements of young sexual abuse victims.
This exception was enacted as a direct result of a highly publicized
series of allegedly abusive acts which occurred in the Miami area. In
1985, legislation had been introduced to expand section 90.803(2), the
hearsay exception for excited utterance, and section 90.803(4), the hear-
say exception for medical diagnosis and treatment, so that these excep-
tions would cover out-of-court statements by child abuse victims.
These legislative deliberations occurred almost a year before
Renville was decided. At that time, the leading case was United States v.
Iron Shell,2 5 an earlier Eighth Circuit decision in which the court held
that the out-of-court statements of a nine-year-old victim of a sexual
attack were inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4). In that
23. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (2001).
24. A similar argument was rejected in State v. Ocha, 576 So. 2d 854, 855 (Fla. 3d DCA
1991). In Ocha the court rejected an argument that a special showing of reliability should be
applied to statements of the victim for medical diagnosis and treatment. "The Evidence Code
itself does not require such an additional showing. Instead, the courts have considered that the
rationale underpinning the medical diagnosis and treatment exception applies to adults and minors
alike, and treat a child declarant's statements as admissible under this hearsay exceptions.
Questions about the age of the child and the circumstances under which the statement was made
ordinarily go to the weight, rather than admissibility, of the testimony." Ochoa, 576 So. 2d at 856-
57.
25. 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980).
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decision, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that "the state-
ments concern what happened rather than who assaulted her. The for-
mer in most cases is pertinent to diagnosis and treatment while the latter
would seldom, if ever, be sufficiently related. 26 Thus, statements of
identity generally were not admitted under the federal hearsay exception
for statements to a medical provider, even in sexual abuse prosecutions,
at the time when the Florida legislature passed section 90.803(23), the
hearsay exception for victim of child abuse. The paradigmatic shift rep-
resented by Renville had yet to occur.
Prior to the passage of section 90.803(23), I testified before legisla-
tive committees and urged the Florida legislature not to expand the lan-
guage of section 90.803(2) or section 90.803(4) to include statements of
child abuse victims. Rather, I suggested that the Legislature adopt what
became section 90.803(23), an exception for all reliable out-of-court
statements of young child sexual abuse victims. 27 The proposed child
abuse exception was adopted and the excited utterance and medical
diagnosis and treatment exceptions remained unchanged. Although one
could argue that section 90.803(23) is too restrictive because it contains
an age limit, the judicial system's preference for live testimony and face-
to-face confrontation is better served by section 90.803(23), which
requires a more mature child to testify that the defendant committed the
crime as opposed to letting the prosecution rely on the victim's out-of-
court statement.
Jones resolved a split between the district courts of appeal on the
issue of whether statements of a child to a medical provider are admissi-
ble under section 90.803(4), the hearsay exception for statement to a
medical provider, as well as section 90.803(23).28 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal found statements of identity of a child abuse victim
inadmissible under section 90.803(4),29 while the First District Court of
Appeal said in dicta that they are admissible.3 ° In Jones, the Florida
Supreme Court addressed the issue for the first time and held these types
of statements are inadmissible under section 90.803(4), consistent with
the Florida Legislature's intent.
Mrs. Contreras's argument that section 90.803(4) should be inter-
preted to include statements of identity when the declarant is a young
victim of sexual abuse if special judicially-created factors are applied to
26. Id. at 84.
27. The Jones decision cited to my testimony. Jones, 625 So. 2d at 825.
28. In State v. Ocha, 576 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), the Third District Court of Appeal
recognized, but did not decide, the issue.
29. Hanson v. State, 508 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).
30. Flanagan v. State, 586 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. Ist DCA 1991) acq. in result, 625 So. 2d 827
(Fla. 1993).
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determine reliability, acknowledges the problems with the reliability of
these statements. 3' Ms. Contreras apparently argues that, rather than
apply the explicit case-specific reliability determination of section
90.803(23), it is better policy for the court to apply a set of factors not
apparent on the face of section 90.803(4).
The significance of her criticism of Jones is unclear. Reliable state-
ments of identity of a young child that are admissible under Renville
would be sufficiently reliable to be admitted under the child hearsay
exception. The special factors that Renville courts apply to ensure relia-
bility of statements of identity offered under Federal Rule of Evidence
803(4), are similar to those applied to ensure the reliability of statements
admitted in Florida under section 90.803(23). Federal courts and other
jurisdictions have resisted the extension of Renville regarding statements
of fault and identity into cases that do not involve child abuse. This
restriction recognizes by implication the reliability concern, and the
Renville exception is probably based on the need for the evidence when
the child may be incompetent or an extremely ineffective witness if
called to testify, as well as the nature of the offense.
If the victim of abuse is over eleven years of age, the prosecution is
at a disadvantage under Jones because the child's out-of-court state-
ments of identity to a medical provider are inadmissible under both sec-
tions 90.803(4) and 90.803(23).32 The policy concerns expressed in
Renville and the legislative discussions are not as strong when the victim
is not a young child. A victim who is older than eleven usually is able to
testify and communicate what has occurred to the jury concerning the
abusive act. The victim's live testimony furthers the constitutional pref-
erence for face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination, as embod-
ied by the Florida Legislature's policy judgment in section 90.803(23) to
include an age limit. Moreover, as Jones itself recognized, the decision
is not a bar to the admission of all testimony concerning out-of-court
statements of identity by a victim over the age of eleven. These out-of-
court statements may be admissible as prior consistent statements,33
statements of identification, excited utterances,34 or under some other
hearsay exception.
31. Why else would she advocate the application of a set of special factors that are not
applicable to other statements offered under section 90.803(4), Florida Statutes?
32. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (2001) (contains an age limit of eleven).
33. State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1993).
34. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77
(8th Cir. 1980).
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B. Statements of Elderly Victims
In 1995, section 90.803(24)35 was enacted, creating a hearsay
exception for statements by elderly or disabled victims of enumerated
violent crimes, including acts of abuse or neglect. The exception was
modeled after the child abuse victim exception found in section
90.803(23). In Conner v. State,36 however, the Florida Supreme Court
held that section 90.803(24) is facially violative of the Due Process
37
and Confrontation Clauses.38 As Stacy Schulman's Comment The Flor-
ida Supreme Court v. The United States Supreme Court points out, Con-
ner is difficult to understand in light of the court's earlier decision
upholding a similar constitutional challenge to section 90.803(23)-an
almost identical statutory hearsay exception in which the most signifi-
cant difference is that the declarant is a victim of child sexual abuse
rather than a victim of a crime against the elderly or disabled.
Rather than focus on the criteria outlined in Ohio v. Roberts39 to
determine whether a recently adopted hearsay exception complies with
the Confrontation Clause, one should look to Idaho v. Wright.40 Wright
is a better guide because it interpreted a statement of a child abuse vic-
tim to a pediatrician that was admitted under a state's residual hearsay
exception, and because Justice O'Connor established the parameters for
determining whether a statement admitted under an exception that is not
firmly-rooted has "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 41 In her
opinion, Justice O'Connor held that the only factors to consider in mak-
ing this determination are "those that surround the making of the state-
ment and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.
4
Justice O'Connor rejected the use of other evidence at trial that cor-
roborates the truthfulness of the hearsay statement. The Wright Court
applied this analysis and found that the admission of the child's state-
ments to the pediatrician under Idaho's residual exception violated the
defendant's confrontation rights. The Court reasoned that the trial court
impermissibly relied upon evidence to corroborate the truthfulness of the
child's statement; the factors which surrounded the making of the state-
ment were too few to ensure that the statement possessed particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.
In its decision, the Wright Court also rejected the approach of the
35. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24) (2001).
36. 748 So. 2d 950 (2000).
37. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
38. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
39. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
40. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
41. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
42. Wright, 497 U.S. at 819.
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Idaho Supreme Court, which had found that the introduction of the state-
ment violated the Confrontation Clause4 3 because the interview lacked
sufficient procedural safeguards. The Court noted that the pediatrician
failed to videotape the interview, asked leading questions, and had a
preconceived idea the interview was with a child abuse victim."4 The
Court held that the United States Constitution did not impose "a fixed
set of procedural prerequisites to the admission of such statements at
trial,' 45 and the Idaho Supreme Court's imposition of procedural
requirements for the admission of child hearsay statements in sexual
abuse cases was inappropriate or unnecessary.46
The cases interpreting the constitutionality of section 90.803(23)
are important because the language of section 90.803(24) tracks the lan-
guage of section 90.803(23). In Perez v. State,4 7 the Florida Supreme
Court held that section 90.803(23) was constitutional. In that opinion,
the court commented:
Although the legislature provided a list of various elements that the
court may consider in determining whether the time, content, and cir-
cumstances of the child victim's statement provide sufficient safe-
guards of reliability,. . . the list is not exhaustive, as demonstrated by
that portion of the subsection which provides that the court may also
consider 'any other factor deemed appropriate.' Indeed there could be
no exhaustive list of elements to be considered. Each declaration,
factually, will present varying elements relevant to the factors of
time, content and circumstance and the determination of reliability
cannot rest upon any specific calculation.48
Subsequently, in State v. Townsend,49 the Florida Supreme Court reaf-
firmed its ruling in Perez in light of Idaho v. Wright5" and mentioned a
number of factors that could be considered in determining the reliability
of an out-of-court statement by a child.5'
In considering whether the exception for statements of the elderly
violates the accused's confrontation rights, the Conner court reached a
result contrary to its decision in Townsend. The Conner court appears to
be concerned about two issues. First, the court is concerned with the
breadth of the statute; apparently section 90.803(24) applies to most
declarants over the age of sixty, rather than being limited to declarants,
43. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
44. Wright, 497 U.S. at 812-813.
45. Id. at 818.
46. Id. at 818-19.
47. 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1989).
48. Id. at 210.
49. 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
50. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
51. Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 957-58.
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such as a young children, who may prove to be ineffective witnesses or
may be found incompetent to testify at trial. Second, the court was una-
ble to discern any factors that could be used by the trial court to deter-
mine whether the out-of-court statement of an elderly declarant is
reliable.52
The Conner court was concerned with its inability to compile a
"list" of factors that could be applied by the trial courts in determining
reliability. The Perez decision, however, rejected a requirement for such
a list as did the United States Supreme Court in Wright. Justice
O'Connor's opinion also indicated that the following factors could be
applied to determine reliability of the child's statement: (1) spontaneity
and repetition of the statement; (2) the mental state of the declarant; (3)
the use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age; and (4) the
lack of a motive to fabricate. Both Wright and Perez recognized that it
is not possible to have an exhaustive list of factors applicable to all
abuse cases, since each out-of-court statement will present varying ele-
ments of time, place, and circumstance.
However, there appear to be factors that can ensure the necessary
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness for statements offered under
section 90.803(24), recognizing that each statement will factually pre-
sent varying "elements relevant to the factors of time, content and cir-
cumstance and [that] the determination of reliability cannot rest upon
any specific calculation. '5 3 Many of the same factors which have been
deemed to be relevant in determining reliability under section
90.803(23) also would be relevant to the reliability of a statement
offered under section 90.803(24)-for example: (1) spontaneity and
consistent repetition of the statement; (2) the mental state of the declar-
ant, the lack of a motive to fabricate; (3) whether the statement was
made at the first opportunity following the incident; and (4) whether the
statement was in response to questions.
While the text of section 90.803(24) sets forth some factors that the
Florida Legislature deemed relevant to the issue of reliability, the Con-
ner court found that the list is inadequate and does not ensure that out-
52. Ms. Schulman argues that although there are no factors or list of factors that could
guarantee the reliability of statements made by the victims in physical abuse cases that are
admissible under section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes the statute has withstood constitutional
muster. She reasons that, even if there are no factors that guarantee reliability under section
90.803(24), a similar constitutional analysis and result should follow. The Florida Supreme Court,
however, has never interpreted the constitutionality or meaning of section 90.803(23) in the
context of a physical abuse prosecution. If the Florida Supreme Court concludes that there are no
factors which provide 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' to statements of physical
abuse, the admission of hearsay statements under section 90.803(24) will violate the confrontation
rights of the accused.
53. Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206, 210 (Fla. 1989); see Wright, 497 U.S. at 822.
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of-court statements of the elderly are reliable. If it remains sound public
policy to recognize this hearsay exception when out-of-court statements
are offered by the prosecution in criminal cases, it is incumbent upon the
legislature to consider whether additional factors might ensure reliability
and to include them in an amendment to section 90.803(24). 54
III.
PRIOR ACTS OF ABUSE
George Franklin's Comment Navigating Between Extremes
thoughtfully analyzes Florida case law regarding the admissibility of
uncharged misconduct evidence (a/k/a "similar fact evidence" or "Wil-
liams rule evidence"55 ) in child sexual abuse prosecutions. In Heuring
v. State, the Florida Supreme Court held that in a prosecution for sexual
battery upon a child in a familial or custodial setting a prior act of abuse
that shares significant similarities with the charged act is admissible
under section 90.404(2), the Florida equivalent of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 404, to corroborate the testimony of the child-victim.5 6 Subse-
quently, the court expanded this use of collateral crime evidence to any
case involving child sexual abuse where the prior and charged offenses
are "strikingly similar."5 7 This latter decision indicates that one of the
significant points of similarity that can be considered by the trial court is
whether both offenses occurred in a familial or custodial setting.5 8
The balance between the competing interests in these cases is diffi-
cult: the need for a fair trial of the accused against the egregious nature
of the crime and the difficulty in prosecuting a case where the victim is a
young child and the offense occurs in private. The root of the problem
54. During the 2000 session of the Florida Legislature, a bill was introduced to amend section
90.803(24), Florida Statutes in light of Conner. The following factors were included in the
language of the exception to be considered by the trial court in determining reliability: the
statement's spontaneity; whether the statement was made at the first available opportunity
following the alleged incident; whether the statement was elicited in response to questions; the
mental state of the elderly person; when the incident was reported; whether the elderly person
used terminology unexpected of a person with his or her disability; the motive or the lack of
motive to fabricate the statement; the vagueness of the accusations; the possibility of any improper
influence on the elderly person; and contradictory statements by the elderly person. Fla. CS for SB
2048 (2000). This amendment to section 90.803(24) was not enacted by the legislature and no
similar legislation was introduced during the 2001 session.
55. See generally CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 404.9 (2001).
56. 513 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1987).
57. Saffor v. State, 660 So. 2d 668, 671 (Fla. 1990).
58. Id. This is not the exclusive purpose of admitting evidence under section 90.404(2),
Florida Statutes in sexual abuse prosecutions. Evidence is admissible under section 90.404(2) to
prove any relevant fact or issue other than propensity or bad character. Heuring recognized that
"corroboration" of a sexual abuse "victim's testimony" is a permissible purpose, which is different
than propensity. Heuring, 513 So. 2d at 125. Arguably, section 90.404(2) is not expanded by this
line of cases.
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in determining how to achieve a proper balance in this area in Florida
may have originated in the Heuring decision itself. There, the issue
briefed and argued before the Florida Supreme Court was whether col-
lateral evidence of a prior act of abuse was admissible to prove a "pat-
tern of criminality" on the part of the defendant.5 9 After rejecting the
evidence offered for this purpose under section 90.404(2), the court's
decision adopted the "bolstering the testimony of the victim" theory
even though neither party briefed or argued that issue.6° The theoretical
basis underlying Heuring was not fully set forth and the cases subse-
quently interpreting it have not been able to supply the rationale. In fact,
there is enough uncertainty that two recent commentators have been
unable to agree whether Heuring expands or limits the use of collateral
crime evidence in child sexual abuse cases.6'
The Heuring opinion's lack of a clearly enunciated rationale is one
reason it is difficult to understand the Heuring progeny. One of the
justifications for the decision in Heuring is that the testimony of the
victim is corroborated because evidence of a prior sexual offense com-
mitted by the accused that shares sufficient similarity to the victim's
account of the charged offense makes it less likely that the accused
fabricated testimony regarding the charged offense. A second justifica-
tion, which is similar, is the doctrine of chances. 62 The Florida Supreme
Court, however, has never directly embraced either of these theories.63
Finally, it may be argued that the evidence of prior acts corroborates that
a criminal act occurred, rather than indicating the defendant's propensity
to commit the criminal act. The problem with these theories is that it is
difficult, if not impossible, for the jury to distinguish between evidence
that is offered for any of the above purposes and evidence that is offered
to show the defendant's propensity to commit the abusive act. 64 As a
result of this difficulty, the dangers that justify the exclusion of propen-
sity evidence-that the jury will give the propensity evidence too much
59. Heuring, 513 So. 2d at 125.
60. Id.
61. Compare David M. De La Paz, Sacrificing the Whole Truth in Florida's Deteriorating
Admissibility of Similar Fact Evidence in Cases of Child Sexual Abuse, 15 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM.
RTS. 449 (1999) with Richard J. Sanders, "A Dangerous Bend in the Ancient Road: " The Use of
Similar Fact Evidence for Corroboration, 74 FLA. B. J. 40 (Feb. 2000).
62. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 4.01 (1984).
63. See Saffor v. State, 660 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1995) (Anstead, J., concurring) (approving
portion of First District dissent setting forth the rationale for Heuring).
64. See Farrill v. State, 759 So. 2d 696, 702 (Fla, 2nd DCA 2000) (Altenbernd, A.C.J.,
concurring) ("No matter whether we justify the introduction of this evidence as 'corroborative' of
a witness' testimony, or relevant to 'motive,' 'intent,' or 'plan,' I think we ought to admit that it is
actually introduced, or at least relied upon by jurors, because it is a prior behavior that we believe,
with or without scientific basis, to be validly predictive of subsequent sexual misconduct by the
defendant.").
[Vol. 55:645
2001] WHEN CHILDREN AND THE ELDERLY ARE VICTIMS 657
significance or will convict because the accused is a bad person-are
also present when evidence is offered to corroborate the victim's
testimony.
One barrier to understanding Florida case law regarding uncharged
misconduct evidence is the erroneous assumption that evidence must be
similar in order to be admissible under section 90.404(2). Admissibility
of this evidence depends on its relevancy, not on its similarity. While
sufficiently unique similarities may supply the basis for admitting
uncharged misconduct evidence to prove issues such as identity, evi-
dence of other crimes that is not similar is admissible to prove any mate-
rial fact or issue. Additionally, not all similar fact evidence is
admissible under section 90.404(2).65
The lack of a theoretical rationale as well as the court's incorrect
assumption that the evidence is admissible simply because it is similar,
make it difficult to understand when evidence offered to corroborate the
testimony of the victim has sufficient similarity to be admitted under the
"corroboration" theory. There is little guidance from Florida courts to
determine when the necessary similarity is present. Some appellate
decisions have resorted to listing both similar and dissimilar factors in
determining whether the evidence was admissible.66 The difficulty with
this approach, however, is in understanding which similarities or dissim-
ilarities are significant. In compiling any list of similarities, the items to
be included depend upon the person compiling the list, creating a risk
that the person making the list may skew the factors consciously or sub-
consciously in order to achieve a desired outcome. In fact, one appellate
judge who authored a concurring opinion that used a list of factors to
determine whether there were sufficient similarities to admit the evi-
dence recently wrote that "that the district courts' efforts to identify rele-
vant factors in this analysis have added little to the existing case-by-case
method,' 67 and that he "frankly doubt[s] ... that [he has] ... the exper-
tise to determine what specific behavior is validly predictive of subse-
quent sexual misconduct."68
Mr. Franklin questions the policy of restricting the use of collateral
crime evidence to prosecutions of child sexual abuse in a familial or
custodial setting. The successful prosecution of crimes involving physi-
cal abuse of a child, sexual battery upon an adult, and other crimes that
frequently occur in private, similarly depend on the credibility of the
65. I discuss this point in EHRHARDT, supra note 55, § 404.9.
66. See Shipman v. State, 668 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Moore v. State, 659 So. 2d
414 (Fla. 1995).
67. Farrill, 759 So. 2d at 702 n.2. (citing EHRHARDT, supra note 55, § 404.18, at 207).
68. Id. at 701.
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victim since no eye witnesses exist. There appears to be no rationale for
limiting the use of collateral crime evidence to a child sexual abuse vic-
tim's testimony, other than the vile nature of the charged offense and the
difficulty of proving that the defendant committed the abuse.
Mr. Franklin argues that the approach of the United States Con-
gress in enacting Federal Rule of Evidence 414 was unsound policy.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, prior acts of child molestation are
admissible to prove any relevant issue in a child abuse prosecution,
including propensity. Federal appellate decisions have also required that
statements admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 414 must also pass
a Federal Rule of Evidence 403 balancing test in order to insure that
there is no prejudice.69 The Federal Rules of Evidence treat child abuse
or molestation cases differently than other criminal or civil cases where
propensity evidence is regularly excluded. This differential treatment
conflicts with the tenet that the same rules of evidence should apply to
the trial of all cases and that special evidentiary rules for particular cases
should not be applied.
Subsequent to Mr. Franklin's presentation at the symposium, the
Florida legislature amended section 90.404 by adding language in sub-
section (b) that is similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 414.70 The amend-
ment, which became effective on July 1, 2001, substantially relaxes the
prohibition on the admissibility of similar fact evidence to prove the
propensity of the accused to commit the charged act of child molesta-
tion. Thus, Heuring and Saffor apparently lose their significance. The
amendment expands the admissibility of prior acts of abuse. Now, evi-
dence of prior acts of child abuse are admissible to show the defendant's
propensity to commit the charged act of abuse or molestation in addition
to corroborating the testimony of the victim. Most prosecutors will
probably offer the evidence for the former purpose.
The Florida Legislature, however, may have created a new period
of uncertainty in Florida. Evidence of prior acts of abuse offered under
the amended section 90.404(b) is now subject to a section 90.403 bal-
ancing. 7l The factors that must be considered by the trial court in under-
taking this balancing must be defined by the Florida appellate courts.
69. See, e.g., United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889 (10th Cir. 1999); FED. R. EVID. 403.
70. Fla. CS for SB 2012 (2001). Section 90.404(b), Florida Statutes now provides:
". In a criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving child
molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child
molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant.
2. For the purpose of this paragraph, the term 'child molestation' means conduct proscribed
by s. 794.011 or s. 800.04 when committed against a person 16 years of age or younger." FLA.
STAT. § 90.404(b) (2001).
71. See Henry v. State, 574 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1991); Bryan v. State, 533 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1988).
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Recently, one federal court outlined the following factors to consider
when evaluating a statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 414 and
403: (1) the similarity of the prior act to the charged act; (2) the temporal
proximity of the prior act to the charged act; (3) the frequency of the
prior acts; (4) the presence of lack of intervening circumstances; and (5)
the necessity of that evidence beyond the testimony of the witnesses
already offered at trial.72 Additionally, the Rule 403 balancing test must
be made on the record in the federal courts.
7 3
Although the Florida courts usually view federal decisions inter-
preting a Federal Rule of Evidence as persuasive guidelines for inter-
preting a given provision of the Florida Evidence Code that is based on a
Federal Rule of Evidence," determining the appropriate factors and the
manner that they should be weighed in the section 90.403 balancing will
take time. Perhaps the uncertainty in defining adequate similarity under
Heuring and Saffor will be less, at least in the near term, than the uncer-
tainties involved in the admission of evidence under sections 90.404(b)
and 90.403.75
72. See Doe v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2000).
73. See id. at 1268; see also United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2000);
FED. R. EVID. 403.
74. See Dinter v. Brewer, 420 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
75. There may also be a period of uncertainty until the Florida Supreme Court determines
whether section 90.404(b) is substantive or procedural and, if the latter, whether the court will
adopt it through its rule-making authority. See In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code,
782 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 2000).
